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TACTFUL INATTENTION:                       
ERVING GOFFMAN, PRIVACY IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE, AND THE VIRTUE OF 
AVERTING ONE’S EYES 
ELIZABETH DE ARMOND† 
Finders, keepers 
Losers, weepers1 
 
Mind your own beeswax2 
INTRODUCTION 
According to the sociologist Erving Goffman, we each need a 
backstage in which we “can relax; [we] can drop [our] front, forgo 
speaking [our] lines and step out of character.”3  That is, we need 
a place to free ourselves from the “façade of performance” that 
being in front of others can impose.4  Shielding one’s backstage 
from outsiders has become much harder.  Developments in 
information technology have made accessible all sorts of 
“backstage” areas, including our social activities with family and 
friends, our financial choices and commitments, and our 
purchasing preferences, among heaps of others.  With all the 
information swirling around us, we may have to innovate our 
approaches to protecting privacy. 
Rather than feasting on any and all data we can find, 
perhaps, we could occasionally avert our eyes from information 
that’s not our own.  “Tactful inattention,”5 coined by Goffman, 
 
† Professor, Legal Research and Writing and Director of Legal Writing, Chicago-
Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. 
1 Old English adage. 
2 American saying, attributed by some to colonial America. See STEVEN D. 
PRICE, ENDANGERED PHRASES: INTRIGUING IDIOMS DANGEROUSLY CLOSE TO 
EXTINCTION 144 (2011). 
3 ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 70 (1959) 
[hereinafter GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION]. 
4 Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a 
Networked World, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559, 570 (2015) (citing GOFFMAN, THE 
PRESENTATION, supra note 3, at 112). 
5 Goffman also sometimes referred to it as “civil inattention.” See, e.g., ERVING 
GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES: NOTES ON THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF 
GATHERINGS 84 (1963). Subsequently, Professor Anita Allen described a similar 
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describes the appropriate response of an outsider who makes an 
“inopportune intrusion[]” into a region where insiders have 
“patently been witnessed in activity that is quite incompatible 
with the impression that they are, for wider social reasons, in a 
position to maintain to the intruder.”6  An outsider should adopt 
this tactful inattention response when that outsider gained 
access to the insider’s area notwithstanding the insider’s 
intentions to keep the region, the “backstage,” curtained off, at 
least from that particular intruder.7  The insider and the outsider 
share the burden—the insider must take steps to create a 
bounded backstage, and, correspondingly, the outsider must 
observe those boundaries. 
With the phrase “tactful inattention,” Goffman captured the 
socially salutary response to the undue access to someone’s 
backstage; it is a sort of averting one’s eyes, as one might do, for 
instance, in a locker room or a gym.  Information may be 
available to you, but you should not scrutinize it or use it to your 
own advantage. 
However, in contrast to the tactful inattention paradigm, 
many laws intended to protect privacy protect only “secret” 
information, and largely prohibit the disclosure, rather than the 
use of the information.  Under this paradigm, which Professor 
Daniel Solove labels the “secrecy paradigm,”8 to prevent others 
from using information they have acquired about you for 
evaluating you, you must keep the information entirely under 
wraps.  This can be thought of as the “finders-keepers” paradigm.  
Privacy laws that adopt the secrecy paradigm assume that the 
way to protect individual privacy is for the individual to entomb 
the information.  However, the secrecy paradigm is at odds with 
advances in information technology that have crippled our ability 
to keep information secret.  We dribble data crumbs everywhere 
we go, leaving the possibility that the only backstage area 
 
concept of “virtuous inattention.” See Anita Allen, Privacy Law: Positive Theory and 
Normative Practice, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 241, 243–44 (2013). 
6 GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION, supra note 3, at 132. 
7 See id. at 132–35. 
8 See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY 
IN THE INFORMATION AGE 42–44 (2004); Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: 
Public Records, Privacy, and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1140–41 
(2002) (“[T]he ‘secrecy paradigm[]’ understands privacy as depending upon whether 
information is secret or non-secret. The secrecy paradigm fails to account for the 
realities of the Information Age, where information is rarely completely 
confidential.”). 
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remaining to any of us is the interior of our own heads.9  The ease 
with which these crumbs can be mapped, linked, copied, and 
shared by electronic means has exponentially increased the 
accessibility of personal information, and correspondingly 
crippled the efficacy of the secrecy paradigm. 
As barriers to accessibility of information have dissolved, the 
secrecy paradigm leads to a game of cat and mouse, with the 
winner taking the position that discovery yields all spoils.  To 
dislodge an item of information is to destroy any privacy 
entitlement.  This is a “gotcha” paradigm for privacy, whereby 
revealing any information, even unintentionally, risks making it 
available for all to see—and use.  The entire burden for 
protecting privacy rests on the target. 
Given our human, sociological need for a backstage, though, 
this secrecy paradigm rewards those who can use technology to 
shine a spotlight into the darkest niche of every closet, while 
enfeebling individual privacy and the maintenance of backstage 
areas that might allow us to avoid “discrediting,”10 an unexpected 
and unsought change in status.11  To that point, humans may 
well be motivated to discredit.  Goffman emphasizes that by 
nature, humans are eager to “pounce on chinks in [our] symbolic 
armour in order to discredit [our] pretensions.”12 
This Article suggests that we would benefit if we would 
protect privacy by sometimes requiring tactful inattention by 
potential users rather than total secrecy by the target.  That is, 
some legal privacy protections should stop emphasizing secrecy 
and instead emphasize the appropriate uses of personally 
identifiable and often sensitive information by gelling tactful 
inattention into legal standards.  Culturally, such an expansion 
may be difficult, as we tend to a “finders-keepers” attitude 
towards data.  However, given technology’s ability to dissolve 
routine barriers, if we require others to leave some information  
 
 
9 As neuroscience develops, who knows how long it will be before we will read 
brain waves as easily as The New York Times? See Joëlle Anne Moreno, The Future 
of Neuroimaged Lie Detection and the Law, 42 AKRON L. REV. 717, 717–22 (2009) 
(describing some recent developments in cognitive neuroscience research). 
10 GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION, supra note 3, at 7. Goffman emphasized the 
role of “tact,” explaining that “few impressions could survive if those who received 
the impression did not exert tact in their reception of it.” Id. at 7. 
11 Erving Goffman, Embarrassment and Social Organization, 62 AM. J. OF SOC. 
264, 268 (1956). 
12 GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION, supra note 3, at 38. 
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out of some equations, we may be able to retain the personal 
flourishing that privacy promotes, without unduly impairing the 
information needs of others. 
Not only has the tactful inattention paradigm already 
existed in some traditional areas of law, but it also has occurred 
in some new laws in specific areas of recent concern.  Part I 
discusses the benefits to flourishing that privacy provides, both 
individually and within relationships.  Part II describes the 
development of the tactful inattention paradigm in various areas 
of law.  Part III suggests two specific areas that might benefit 
from a paradigm of tactful inattention: the use of certain 
behavioral information by employers to screen applicants and 
employees, and the use of similar information by political 
campaigns and vendors to target behavioral advertising and for 
vendors, micro-target pricing.  Finally, Part IV describes the 
benefits of a tactful inattention approach to privacy in the digital 
age. 
I. THE HUMAN NEED FOR A BACKSTAGE TO FLOURISH 
A. Philosophers on Privacy—Goffman and Others 
To thrive and flourish—to achieve Aristotle’s 
“eudaemonia”13—we need a “backstage” on which to try on 
various roles, and test and assess our reactions to ourselves, 
others, and events.  Furthermore, we need a sheltered area not 
only for our own thoughts, but for some of our relations with 
others.  These relationships benefit not only ourselves, but also 
society as a whole.  To mark the boundaries of these backstage 
areas, we use social rules and conventions that protect dignity.14 
 
13 See Eudemonic, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (defining 
“eudemonic” as being “[c]onducive to happiness”); see also K. Craig Welkener, 
Possible but Not Easy: Living the Virtues and Defending the Guilty, 26 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1083, 1093 (2013) (“Though commentators explain that eudemonia is 
impossible to translate adequately into English, its central meaning can be 
expressed as the good life, a state of wholeness, or flourishing.”); ARISTOTLE, 
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 307 (Martin Ostwald trans., Prentice Hall, Inc., 1999) (c. 384 
B.C.E.) (emphasis in original) (defining “eudaimon” to mean “[H]APPY, usually in the 
sense of a happiness attained by man through his own efforts”). 
14 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the 
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 962 (1989); see also Edward J. Bloustein, 
Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 962, 971 (1964) (describing Warren and Brandeis’s “principle of ‘inviolate 
personality’ to posit the individual’s independence, dignity and integrity”). 
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1. The Backstage for Our Own Thoughts 
To have a backstage promotes personhood15 and autonomy.16  
To protect personhood is to allow ourselves and others to develop 
and maintain the “inviolate personality” of Warren and Brandeis 
fame.17 
When one is completely deprived of a backstage, such as in a 
prison or an asylum, we suffer what Erving Goffman describes as 
an effect of “contaminative exposure.”18  Robert Gerstein has 
emphasized that such “contaminative exposure” hampers 
autonomy: “It is clear that anyone who intrudes uninvited on the 
intimacy of another person interferes with his autonomy in a 
very serious way.”19 
Thus, to preserve autonomy, we need some sort of partition 
that shields us from exposure.  The scholars Georg Simmel, 
Erving Goffman, Robert Post, and Alan Westin all speak of a 
buffer around individuals that protects their privacy.20  For 
Simmel, the buffer is one of “reciprocal reserve and 
indifference,”21 which places an “ideal sphere [that] lies around 
every human being”;22 for Goffman, it is an “information 
 
15 Paul Freund defined “personhood” to mean “those attributes of an individual 
which are irreducible in his selfhood.” Paul A. Freund, Address, 52 A.L.I. PROC. 574 
(1975); see also Jessica L. Roberts, Protecting Privacy to Prevent Discrimination, 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2097, 2106 (2015) (“Protecting privacy allows us to more freely 
construct our identities and negotiate our social interactions.”); Daniel J. Solove, 
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1116 (2002). 
16 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 15, at 2105–06 (“Insofar as privacy is construed 
as a matter of control, its primary underlying norm is autonomy.”); Robert S. 
Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, 89 ETHICS 76, 78 (1978). 
17 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 205 (1890). The phrase has been criticized as being too imprecise. See 
David Rosen & Aaron Santesso, Inviolate Personality and the Literary Roots of the 
Right to Privacy, 23 LAW & LITERATURE 1, 6 (2011); see also Solove, supra note 15, at 
1118 (criticizing the theory of privacy as personhood for failing to adequately define 
“personhood”). 
18 ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL 
PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 23 (1961) [hereinafter GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS]. Goffman 
describes the process of admission to such an institution, emphasizing the 
accumulation of losses of privacy, from having one’s body and possessions physically 
searched, to sleeping in a communal space, using doorless toilets, and suffering 
ceaseless surveillance. Id. at 16–25. 
19 Gerstein, supra note 16, at 76, 78, 80 (1978) (citing GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS, 
supra note 18). 
20 See infra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
21 GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 418 (KURT H. WOLFF ED. 
& TRANS., 1951). 
22 Id. at 321. 
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preserve[]”;23 for Post, the buffer is a “sacred precinct[]”;24 for 
Westin, such a buffer is a reserve, a state of privacy that exists as 
“a psychological barrier against unwanted intrusion.”25 
This buffer protects our dignity and our personhood.26  
Jeffrey Reiman argues that “privacy is necessary to the creation 
of selves out of human beings, since a self is at least in part a 
human being who regards his existence—his thoughts, his body, 
his actions—as his own.”27  Similarly, Stefano Scoglio emphasizes 
the value of “interiority,” “the ability to be self-reflecting and 
critical without reflecting whims imposed by mass-market 
culture.”28 
When others breach the rules that protect these buffers, they 
“damage a person by discrediting his identity and injuring his 
personality.”29  To uphold these rules through, for example, legal 
devices like privacy torts, “simultaneously uphold[s] social norms 
and redress[es] ‘injury to personality.’ ”30 
 
23 ERVING GOFFMAN, The Territories of the Self, in RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: 
MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 38–39 (1971) [hereinafter GOFFMAN, The 
Territories of the Self] (identifying “[t]he set of facts about [one]self to which an 
individual expects to control access while in the presence of others”). 
24 Post, supra note 14, at 960 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
485 (1965)). 
25 ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 32 (1967). Reserve is one of the four 
states of privacy that Alan Westin identifies, along with solitude, anonymity, and 
intimacy. Id. at 31; see also Alan F. Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues 
and Proposals for the 1970’s Part I—The Current Impact of Surveillance on Privacy, 
66 COLUM. L. REV. 1003, 1022 (1966) (describing reserve as the “ ‘mental distance’ to 
protect the personality,” that “takes place in every sort of relationship under the 
rules of social etiquette”). 
26 Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
26, 37 (1976) (“[P]rivacy is fundamentally connected to personhood.”); see also Julie 
E. Cohen, What Privacy Is for, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1906, 1911 (2013) (“Privacy 
is shorthand for breathing room to engage in the processes of boundary management 
that enable and constitute self-development,” and “is one of the resources that 
situated subjects require to flourish.”). 
27 Reiman, supra note 26, at 39 (emphasis in original). 
28 Daniel E. Newman, European Union and United States Personal Information 
Privacy and Human Rights Philosophy—Is There a Match?, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. 
L.J. 307, 315 (2008) (citing STEFANO SCOGLIO, TRANSFORMING PRIVACY: A 
TRANSPARENT PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHTS 2 (1998)). 
29 Post, supra note 14, at 963. Post states that “[b]y following these rules, 
individuals not only confirm the social order in which they live, but they also 
establish and affirm ‘ritual’ and ‘sacred’ aspects of their own and others’ identities.” 
Id. at 962. 
30 Id. at 963. 
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2. The Backstage for Our Relationships 
While we need privacy to preserve the solitude of our 
relationship with ourselves, privacy is also important to our 
relationships with others; Professor Charles Fried argues that 
without privacy, relations of “respect, love, friendship and trust” 
become impossible.31  He, too, rests these relations on the concept 
of personality.32  Like Goffman, Fried invokes the concept of 
respect for others.33  He rejects the privacy-as-secrecy paradigm, 
characterizing privacy as “the control we have over information 
about ourselves.”34  Fried argues that privacy permits us to 
“modulate” friendships,35 and to learn to “express our humanity” 
by learning to accord trust.36 
We can find examples of judicial recognition of the need for 
privacy to protect and nourish such intimate relationships.  For 
instance, in Hamberger v. Eastman, a licentious landlord 
stealthily installed a secret recording device in the bedroom of 
the home he had rented to the plaintiffs, a married couple.37  The 
landlord wired the device to transmit into his own home.38  When 
the plaintiffs uncovered the recorder, they sued the landlord for 
invasion of privacy.  The landlord argued that the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court should dismiss the couple’s invasion 
of privacy claim because they did not allege that anyone actually 
listened to or overheard any sounds from the bedroom.39  
However, the court rejected that argument, concluding that the 
installation of the eavesdropping device was an “injury to 
personality.”40  The court compared the conduct to that of a 
“Peeping Tom,” and quoted Pound’s Jurisprudence to describe  
 
 
 
 
 
31 Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477 (1968). 
32 Id. at 478. 
33 Id. at 479. Fried describes respect as a correlative to morality, something we 
are obligated to demonstrate to one another simply by virtue of being persons. Id. 
34 Id. at 482 (emphasis in original). Furthermore, he sees privacy as a feature of 
liberty. Id. at 483. 
35 Id. at 485. 
36 Id. at 486. He acknowledges, though, that our privacy can be only “relative 
and qualified.” Id. 
37 206 A.2d 239, 239–40 (N.H. 1964). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 242. 
40 Id. 
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the injury as one that “may produce suffering more acute than 
that produced by a mere bodily injury”41 within the married 
plaintiffs’ intimate relationship. 
Professor Post linked the Hamberger court’s respect for the 
couple’s intruded-upon space to the language of the United 
States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut: the marital 
space was a “ ‘sacred precinct[]’ . . . into which it is plainly highly 
offensive to intrude.”42  This sacred precinct did not lie solely 
within the boundaries of either the husband or the wife’s 
personality, but rather within the space those personalities 
shared.43 
A backstage for our relationships allows us to have room to 
develop what James Rachels describes as different patterns of 
behavior for different relationships.44  Privacy allows us to 
control “who has access to us,” and without that control “we 
cannot control the patterns of behavior we need to adopt . . . or 
the kinds of relations with other people that we will have.”45 
Accordingly, by protecting privacy, we create space for 
intimate relationships to flourish, contributing to their 
participants’ eudemonia. 
3. Preservation of Backstages Through Rules of Civility 
So if our personhoods and our relationships with others need 
backstage areas to thrive, how do we define those areas and then 
protect them?  The secrecy paradigm would have us erect 
impermeable domes over them, but doing so may choke our 
flourishing, both of ourselves and of our chosen relationships. In 
that case,  we might well have to go “off the grid” completely to 
avoid inadvertently dribbling data that others could use to 
discredit and harm us, both individually and as members of 
relationships.  In contrast, under the tactful inattention  
 
 
41 Id. (quoting III POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 58 (1959)). Post critiques this aspect 
of the Hamberger opinion because it places “an intense and narrow focus on the 
actual mental suffering of specific individuals.” Post, supra note 14, at 960. 
42 Id. at 960 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)). 
43 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86. 
44 James Rachels, Why Privacy Is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 327 
(1975). Rachels states these different patterns of behavior “are an important part of 
what makes the different relationships what they are.” Id.; see also Roberts, supra 
note 15, at 2107 (footnotes omitted) (“[P]rivacy is essential to our relationships. 
What we reveal to an employer will differ from what we reveal to a family member, 
which will likewise differ from what we reveal to a lover.”). 
45 Rachels, supra note 44, at 331. 
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paradigm, we may justifiably expect that others will avert their 
eyes from information in which they do not have a sufficient 
interest.46 
Law is an “essential element” of privacy,47 and accordingly 
necessary to fully obtain the benefits of personal flourishing and 
fulfilling relationships, along with the societal advantages that 
flow from both.  As explained above,48 a number of privacy 
scholars have described a buffer around individuals, and around 
those engaged in intimate relationships with one another, that 
helps them flourish and that they are entitled to keep shielded.  
How can law map and preserve such buffers, given the 
omniscient availability of data and the avaricious appetites of 
others for it? 
In terms of the buffer’s dimensions, many privacy scholars 
have referred to some set of rules, or conventions, that should set 
the boundaries of the areas to which others should give tactful 
inattention.  In the past, this buffer, these “information 
preserves,”49 often had a geographical aspect.  For instance, to 
illustrate territories of reserve, Professor Post relies on the public 
disclosure case of Huskey v. N.B.C., in which a prisoner who was 
filmed while in the prison’s exercise cage successfully stated a 
claim for invasion of privacy against the television network 
N.B.C. for that filming.50  In this case, the prisoner’s “information 
preserve” was the “expectation . . . that the only ones able to see 
him would be persons ‘to whom he might be exposed as a 
necessary result of his incarceration.’ ”51  The court rejected the 
television network’s argument that the fact that the plaintiff 
could have been seen by others within the prison meant that he 
could not be “secluded” for purposes of the tort.52  The prisoner  
 
 
 
46 For Goffman, tactful inattention, which he also called “civil inattention,” 
“gives to another enough visual notice to demonstrate that one appreciates that the 
other is present . . . while at the next moment withdrawing one’s attention . . . so as 
to express that he does not constitute a target of special curiosity or design.” ERVING 
GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES: NOTES ON THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF 
GATHERINGS 84 (1963). 
47 Fried, supra note 31, at 493. 
48 See supra text accompanying notes 14–47. 
49 GOFFMAN, The Territories of the Self, supra note 23, at 38–39. 
50 632 F. Supp. 1282, 1285 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
51 Id. at 1285. 
52 Id. at 1287. Judge Shadur also noted that “one paradigm case of the tort is 
the Peeping Tom.” Id. at 1288. 
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had been in an area generally outside of the gaze of visitors, one 
in which he could feel “justifiably secluded from the outside 
world.”53 
As Post construes it, the court allowed the “actual customs 
and usages of the exercise cage,” and not the “ ‘objective’ facts of 
visibility, secrecy, anonymity, and solitude,” to define the 
boundaries of the territory in which the prisoner could “legally 
claim the right to undisturbed ‘seclusion.’ ”54  Construing the 
boundaries this way helped to redistribute the power to discredit, 
protecting dignity and autonomy. 
In a similar vein, Fried identifies “convention” as defining 
private areas.55  To preserve these conventions is to justifiably 
demand that others give them tactful inattention.  Meanwhile, 
the Hamberger decision referred to “rules of decency recognized 
by the reasonable man.”56  As mentioned above, Professor Post, 
for his part, describes these as rules of civility, which can help 
define the boundaries of tactful inattention.57 
Jeffrey Reiman also identifies space-framing rules, though 
not as rules of civility but rather as a “social practice.”58  He 
refers obliquely to the boundaries of civility rules by describing 
privacy in relation to the act of “refraining,” which is another 
way of saying “inattending.” According to Reiman, privacy is a 
“complex of behaviors that stretches from refraining from asking 
questions about what is none of one’s business to refraining from 
looking into open windows one passes on the street, from 
refraining from entering a locked door without knocking.”59  
“Privacy is a social ritual by means of which an individual’s 
moral title to his existence is conferred.”60  As examples of these 
rules embodied in law, Post identifies the paired privacy torts of 
intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts as 
“safeguard[ing] rules of civility.”61  These torts thereby protect 
individuals from “the dignitary harm [that] plaintiffs suffer as a 
 
53 Id. 
54 See Post, supra note 14, at 972. 
55 Fried, supra note 31, at 487. 
56 Post, supra note 14, at 963. 
57 Id. at 984. (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, 
in INTERACTION RITUAL: ESSAYS ON FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR 47 (1967)). 
58 Reiman, supra note 26, at 38. 
59 Id. at 38–39. 
60 Id. at 39. 
61 Post, supra note 14, at 959. 
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result of having been treated disrespectfully,”62 much the same 
way that Fried discusses the right of people to be treated with 
respect.63 
Privacy rules support personality development by 
encouraging what Professor Anita Allen calls “virtuous 
inattention,” promoting a “moral virtue” of “[a] balance of 
inattention to others’ personal lives and attention to one’s 
own . . . .”64 
B. The Secrecy Paradigm’s Impairment of the Backstage 
The secrecy paradigm restricts information by focusing on 
nondisclosure, seeking to maintain privacy by “hiding” 
information.65  Sometimes the burden is on the person to whom 
the information pertains.  Other times, the burden to keep 
information secret is not on the target—the person to whom the 
information pertains—but on a third party who possesses the 
information.  A classic secrecy paradigm presents itself in the 
Fourth Amendment’s third-party doctrine, which provides that a 
party usually loses all Fourth Amendment expectations of 
privacy in any information disclosed to a third party.  To disclose 
to one is to disclose to all, and most especially, to the 
government.66 
The Supreme Court created the third-party doctrine in 
United States v. Miller, where it held that the defendant, a bank 
depositor, had no protectable interest under the Fourth 
Amendment in his bank records, subpoenaed by the Treasury 
Department.67  The Court reasoned that the subpoenaed 
documents “[were] not [his] ‘private papers’ ” because they 
“contain[ed] only information voluntarily conveyed to the 
 
62 Id. at 967. Post distinguishes this sort of harm from the “contingent 
psychological injuries that plaintiffs may suffer as a result of the violation of civility 
rules.” Id. at 966. 
63 Fried, supra note 31, at 478. 
64 Allen, supra note 5, at 244 (“Inattention to others’ personal lives may also be 
a qualitative benefit to civil society.”). 
65 See supra Part I and accompanying footnotes. 
66 See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General 
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1036 (2010). But see United States v. Warshak, 
631 F.3d 266, 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that “the mere ability of a third-party 
intermediary to access the contents of a communication cannot be sufficient to 
extinguish a reasonable expectation of privacy” and holding that an email recipient 
could retain a constitutionally-recognized expectation of privacy in email). 
67 425 U.S. 435, 436–37 (1976). 
294 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:283 
banks.”68  Accordingly, “[t]he depositor takes the risk, in 
revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be 
conveyed by that person to the Government.”69 
The Court developed the doctrine more fully in Smith v. 
Maryland,70 in which the petitioner was a robber caught after he 
harassed his victim by calling her from his home phone.71  Using 
the victim’s description of the robber and his car, the police 
investigating the calls were able to trace the robber’s license 
plate number, and then his home address.72  Without a warrant, 
the police had the telephone company install a pen register to 
record the numbers dialed from the thief’s home, which recorded 
a call to the victim.73  On the basis of that evidence, the police 
sought a warrant to search the thief’s home and found evidence 
that led to his arrest and conviction.74  The thief challenged the 
denial of his motion to suppress the evidence from the 
warrantless pen register, arguing that he had an expectation of 
privacy in the numbers that he dialed.75  However, the Court 
ruled that any such expectation was unreasonable because he 
knew that he was disclosing the dialed numbers to the telephone 
company, who needed the numbers to connect his call and to bill 
him.76  In other words, he “voluntarily” turned over that 
information to a third party—the telephone company—and 
thereby lost any expectation of privacy in them.77 
The third-party doctrine has received harsh criticism for its 
conception of privacy, one “that views Fourth Amendment 
privacy as constituting a form of total secrecy.”78  Its application 
 
68 Id. at 441–42. 
69 Id. at 443. 
70 442 U.S. 735, 735 (1979). 
71 Id. at 737. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 737–38. 
76 Id. at 742. 
77 Id. at 744. 
78 Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1136 (2002). Professor Henderson states that:  
The third party doctrine is objectionable even if limited as recommended. 
First, it treats privacy as an indivisible commodity—once information is 
given to any one party for any one purpose, it is treated as if it were given 
to every person for any possible purpose as far as the Fourth Amendment is 
concerned. 
Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational 
Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 546 (2005). Another 
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to modern digital data raises specific concerns, as the Supreme 
Court recognized in 2018 in Carpenter v. United States.79  There, 
five justices trimmed the reach of Smith and Miller, concluding 
that the law enforcement’s capture of cell phones’ cell-site 
location information from telecommunications companies is a 
search that generally requires a warrant under the Fourth 
Amendment.80  The Court emphasized the sensitivity of the data: 
“the time-stamped data provides an intimate window into a 
person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements,” but 
also “ ‘the privacies of life.’ ”81 
While the third-party doctrine would have concluded that 
the cell-phone user voluntarily released the information to their 
providers and thereby lost their privacy interests, the Carpenter 
majority firmly rejected that application, reasoning that the 
doctrine assumes “that an individual has a reduced expectation 
of privacy in information knowingly shared with another.”82  But 
even where one shares information, the doctrine must consider 
“the nature of the particular documents sought.”83  Cell-site 
location data can provide “a detailed chronicle of a person’s 
physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over 
several years.”  In contrast, Smith’s call logs and Miller’s checks 
conveyed limited information.84  Furthermore, the doctrine’s 
other rationale, voluntary exposure of the data, did not logically 
extend to data like cell phone location information because “in no  
 
 
 
scholar states that “[t]he theory in Smith rests on a fallacy,” and compares the 
government’s “snooping” through such third-party information as “smack[ing] of 
Orwell’s Big Brother, protection from which is the essence of the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment.” Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth 
Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 600 (1989); see also Marissa A. Lalli, 
Note, Spicy Little Conversations: Technology in the Workplace and a Call for a New 
Cross-Doctrinal Jurisprudence, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243, 261 (2011) (identifying 
“significant backlash from scholars who find it outdated”). 
79 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
80 Id. at 2221. 
81 Id. at 2217 (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014)). 
82 Id. at 2219. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. The Court characterized the location data as “present[ing] even greater 
privacy concerns than [that of] GPS monitoring of a vehicle.” Id. at 2218. It noted 
that “[w]hile individuals regularly leave their vehicles, they compulsively carry cell 
phones with them all the time. A cell phone faithfully follows its owner beyond 
public thoroughfares and into private residences, doctor’s offices, political 
headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.” Id. 
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meaningful sense does the user voluntarily ‘assume[] the risk’ of 
turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical 
movements.”85 
Nonetheless, the reach of Carpenter is narrow for the 
moment,86 and the secrecy paradigm continues to animate many 
laws outside of the Fourth Amendment realm.  For instance, the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act’s87 Privacy 
Rule88 prohibits regulated parties from disclosing individually 
identifiable health information, and is broadly defined to include 
just about any health-related information traceable to a 
particular individual.89  It represents the secrecy paradigm by 
requiring identifiable data to be entombed, rather than by 
requiring others to avert their eyes from the identifying 
markers.90  In addition, business associates who receive 
personally identifiable information are subject to contractual 
restrictions that bar them from re-disclosing the information 
under many circumstances.91 
 
 
85 Id. at 2220 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979)). 
86 Id. at 2220 (“Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a view on 
matters not before us . . . .”). 
87 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936 (1996). 
88 The Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101–161.105, 164.101–164.106, 164.500–
164.534 (2013). 
89 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(6) (2012). The full definition is as follows: 
The term “individually identifiable health information” means any 
information, including demographic information collected from an 
individual, that-- 
(A) is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, 
or health care clearinghouse; and 
(B) relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or 
condition of an individual, the provision of health care to an individual, or 
the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an 
individual, and-- 
(i) identifies the individual; or 
(ii) with respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe that the 
information can be used to identify the individual. 
90 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM SERVS., O.C.R., Guidance Regarding Methods 
for De-identification of Protected Health Information in Accordance with the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule (Nov. 26, 2012), 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentiti
es/De-identification/hhs_deid_guidance.pdf. 
91 See Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.314 (2013); see also id. § 164.504(e)(2). 
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Similarly, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
employs the secrecy paradigm in places92 to protect genetic 
information by requiring entities subject to the act to keep such 
information as a “confidential medical record,” and to withhold 
disclosure of it, unless a specific exception permits disclosure.93  
These demands place the full burden of privacy on the 
information’s keeper. 
The Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”)94 also adopts the 
secrecy paradigm by prohibiting video tape service providers95 
from “knowingly disclos[ing] . . . personally identifiable 
information concerning any consumer.”96  Two circuit courts of 
appeals have ruled that the VPPA does not authorize a suit 
against a person who receives—as opposed to a service provider 
who discloses—personally identifiable information about a 
consumer.97  Rather, it is the video tape service provider who 
must keep mum about the information once the information is 
received by someone else. 
The secrecy paradigm’s Achilles’ heel is that in the age of 
digital technology and increasing surveillance, keeping 
information secret is formidably difficult, and one dribble of a 
digital crumb can bring a slew of consequences, including the loss 
of the right to harness the laws based on the secrecy paradigm to 
keep the information from being used by others.  Technology has 
made it much easier to grab and keep data that was once 
functionally invisible.98  Companies have greedily sucked up 
 
92 The GINA also employs the tactful inattention paradigm. See infra text 
accompanying notes 135–38. 
93 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-5 (2012) (confidentiality of genetic information); 
29 C.F.R. § 1635.9(a)(1), (b) (2008). 
94 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710 (West 2014). 
95 Id. § 2710(a)(4). 
96 Id. § 2710(b). Certain exceptions are available, including for disclosures 
“incident to the ordinary course of business.” Id. § 2710(b)(2)(E). 
97 In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 281 (3d Cir. 2016); 
Daniel v. Cantrell, 375 F.3d 377, 382–84 (6th Cir. 2004). 
98 In The Right to Privacy, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis referred 
indirectly to the effect of technology in explaining why the tort of breach of 
confidentiality was inadequate to protect privacy: 
The narrower doctrine [of breach of contract] may have satisfied the 
demands of society at a time when the abuse to be guarded against could 
rarely have arisen without violating a contract or special confidence; but 
now that modern devices afford abundant opportunities for the 
perpetration of such wrongs without any participation by the injured party, 
the protection granted by the law must be placed upon a broader 
foundation. 
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 17, at 210–11. 
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information about consumers through their transactions, and 
then when they fail to sufficiently to protect the data they have 
amassed, it becomes a rich target for hackers.99  Accordingly, 
Professors Woodrow and Hartzog describe the secrecy paradigm 
as “unworkable online” in part because “it simply does not reflect 
societal or individual notions of privacy.”100 
We could simply require people to avoid technology should 
they want to continue to keep private information now made 
accessible through technology.  For instance, under old, snail-
mail technology, the contents of a sealed letter are kept cloaked 
from prying eyes.  However, email technology, which has 
replaced snail mail for many uses, reveals to those with access 
everything sent using the system.  So, that argument goes, keep 
your information private by not using modern technology.  
However, letting technology vitiate long-standing privacy 
principles penalizes people who enjoy the benefits of 
technological advancement and who use them to fully participate 
in society.101  
One scholar, Benjamin Zhu, has criticized “[t]he secrecy 
paradigm’s focus on the private-public dichotomy [as] hinder[ing] 
the application of the intrusion tort to the data collection stage of 
 
99 See, e.g., Chronology of Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, 
http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) (identifying 
and describing data breaches from 2005 to the present); Paul Ohm, Branding 
Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907, 908 (2013). 
100 Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2013). The authors describe a concept of obscurity founded in 
part by the court’s reasoning in Pietrylo v. Hillstone Restuarant Group, in which a 
restaurant employee had created a closed group on a social network site that 
permitted visitors only with an invitation and a password. No. 06–5754 (FSH), 2008 
WL 6085437, at *1 (D.N.J. July 25, 2008). One of the users showed the site to a 
restaurant manager, which led to other managers accessing it. Id. The site’s creators 
sued the managers’ employer, alleging, among other claims, invasion of privacy. Id. 
at *2. In denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on that claim, the 
court stated, “Plaintiffs created an invitation-only internet discussion space [in 
which] they had an expectation that only invited users would be able to read the 
discussion.” Id. at *6. Professors Hartzog and Stutzman argue that “[b]y giving such 
weight to password protections, Pietrylo laid the foundation for a concrete concept of 
obscurity.” Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 100, at 27. Other cases focusing on 
password protection, say the authors, “suggest[] that courts are willing to depart 
from the rule that individuals have no expectation of privacy in information posted 
online.” Id. at 28. 
101 See Andrew J. DeFilippis, Note, Securing Informationships: Recognizing a 
Right to Privity in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086, 1091–92 
(2006) (noting the effects on privacy of our transformation to a digital society, and 
stating that “to ask a person to refrain from using e-mail for fear of its recordability 
is to ask him to live a premodern life.”). 
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dataveillance.”102  Professor Patricia Sánchez Abril similarly 
criticized the secrecy paradigm’s application to modern data 
practices, noting that “[i]n cyberspace, the complete secrecy 
requirement of privacy torts is difficult, if not impossible, to 
satisfy.  Total secrecy is difficult offline; this difficulty is 
magnified online.”103 
A different approach to this accessibility advance is to adapt 
the secrecy paradigm to the new technology by pretending that 
the access has not arisen.  For instance, although the attorney-
client privilege is generally waived when an attorney 
communicates otherwise confidential information to a client in 
front of a third party,104 several courts have ruled that using 
email to communicate confidential information will not void the 
privilege–even though the technology has the capability of 
revealing the information to any number of potential watchers 
along the way.105  This is something of a “secrecy fiction,” but one 
 
102 Benjamin Zhu, A Traditional Tort for a Modern Threat: Applying Intrusion 
upon Seclusion to Dataveillance Observations, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2381, 2397 (2014). 
Professor Zhu cites two Illinois cases that illustrate this shortcoming of the secrecy 
paradigm. In Busse v. Motorola, Inc., a class of mobile phone customers alleged that  
their service providers had transferred their customer data to a private research 
firm, including names, addresses, and dates of birth, for its own study; the court 
held that no intrusion had occurred because the information was not private. 813 
N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). Similarly, in  Dwyer v. American Express Co., 
charge card holders challenged the defendants’ practice of renting to third parties 
lists compiling their spending information; the court held that no unauthorized 
intrusion occurred, because “[b]y using the American Express card, a cardholder is 
voluntarily, and necessarily, giving information to defendants that, if analyzed, will 
reveal a cardholder’s spending habits and shopping preferences.” 652 N.E.2d 1351, 
1354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
103 Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 25 (2007). As an example, Professor Abril cites Wilson v. 
Harvey, 842 N.E.2d 83 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). In that case, a college student sued 
three fellow students who had put up flyers around campus with the plaintiff’s 
name, email, and phone number that depicted him as a homosexual. Id. at 86. The 
appellate court affirmed a directed verdict on the student’s public disclosure of 
private facts claim, reasoning that none of the published information was private 
because “it was published in various forms obtainable by university students and 
faculty.” Id. at 91. 
104 See Lluberes v. Uncommon Prods., LLC, 663 F.3d 6, 24 (1st Cir. 2011); see 
generally, 2 Paul R. Rice, ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE U.S. § 9:79 (2017). 
105 See, e.g., In re Asia Glob. Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247, 251 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (concluding that communicating with one’s attorney via email does not, 
without more, waive the protection of the attorney-client privilege); City of Reno v. 
Reno Police Protective Ass’n, 59 P.3d 1212, 1218 (Nev. 2002). A third party’s 
presence will generally not nullify the privilege where the third party is a necessary 
participant to the conversation. See, e.g., PSE Consulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & 
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that may be justified by the policies underlying the 
confidentiality privilege. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF TACTFUL INATTENTION 
We exercise tactful inattention in our social interactions.  As 
Jeffrey Rosen has pointed out, “it[ i]s considered rude to stare at 
strangers whom you encounter in public.”106  For instance, to use 
a real-territory (rather than a cyber-territory) example, an 
American bathroom stall affords privacy but not through ironclad 
barriers to prying eyes—they usually have gaps at the top and 
bottom edges and between the door and its frame.107  
Nonetheless, we justifiably expect that notwithstanding these 
points of access, others will avert their eyes from our 
vulnerabilities when we are within that space.  One scholar of 
privacy and design invokes Goffman’s “civil inattention” to 
describe it as a “device of scrupulously observed avoidance 
behavior . . . [that] demands that we avoid observing other 
people’s behavior . . . .”108 
Tactful inattention may be a concept recognized more readily 
by some other cultures.  For instance, in Germany it is possible 
that one may appear fully nude in a public park, yet maintain a 
culturally-accepted belief that one is entitled to not be stared at, 
that is, to be entitled to have others avert their eyes from the 
display of nudity.109  One author characterizes this practice as 
“respectful ‘civil inattention.’ ”110 
 
Sons, Inc., 838 A.2d 135, 167 n.28 (Conn. 2004); People v. Osorio, 75 N.Y.2d 80, 84, 
549 N.E.2d 1183, 550 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1989). 
106 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN 
AMERICA 16 (2000) (citing GOFFMAN, supra note 5, at 84–85, 116). 
107 However, one author has emphasized the difference in architectural design of 
American public bathrooms, and their fostering of policing functions, compared with 
those in Europe, where complete “floor-to-ceiling enclosures” are more common. 
ALEXANDER KIRA, THE BATHROOM 204–05 (Viking Press 1976). 
108 Id. at 204. We do this by “try[ing] to ignore the presence of other problems 
while at the same time acknowledging them by being careful not to intrude on their 
privacy.” Id. He describes the example of diners in Soviet restaurants, “which have 
the disconcerting habit, for us, of filling every empty seat with unrelated diners.” Id. 
Accordingly, an unrelated pair of diners seated at a table for four “can preserve their 
privacy only . . . by mutually practicing civil inattention or avoidance behavior . . . ” 
Id. at 204. He points out that “[c]ivil inattention” as a term describes our 
“instinctive[] realiz[ation] that the delicate behavioral devices that guarantee our 
privacy and that of our neighbors is a mutually dependent exercise.” Id. 
109 See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus 
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1201 (2004) (“As any German there will tell you, it is a 
matter of ordinary politeness that nude people have a right not to be stared at. 
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A. Traditional Examples of Tactful Inattention in Law 
The expectation of tactful inattention arises not only in 
social settings; it also exists in legal expectations.  While the 
secrecy paradigm is common,111 the concept of mandating tactful 
inattention already appears in some laws.  Sometimes the law 
directs itself to tactful inattention from the start, prohibiting an 
initial capture of others’ information, and sometimes it directs 
itself to post-capture behavior, prohibiting the use of the 
information. 
1. Tactful Inattention by Prohibiting the Capture of Available 
Information 
“Peeping Tom” statutes represent an early attempt to 
encourage the averting of eyes.112  They do not restrict criminal 
liability to those situations where the target has taken all 
possible steps to limit access to view, but rather put some onus 
on the peeper to confine his gaze.113  For instance, Louisiana 
defines a “Peeping Tom” as “one who peeps through windows or 
doors . . . situated on or about the premises of another . . . for the 
purpose of spying upon or invading the privacy of persons spied 
upon.”114  Curiously, Peeping Tom statutes tend not to specifically 
define the verb “peep.”  The Oxford English Dictionary defines it 
as “[t]o look through a narrow aperture . . . to look quickly or 
furtively from a vantage point; to steal a glance.”115  The fact that  
 
 
 
 
Taking off all your clothes, even in a public park, does not constitute a surrender of 
your privacy.”). 
110 CARLIN A. BARTON, ROMAN HONOR: THE FIRE IN THE BONES 204 n.18 (2001). 
111 See supra text accompanying notes 8–11. 
112 See, e.g., H. Morley Swingle & Kevin M. Zoellner, Criminalizing Invasion of 
Privacy: Taking a Big Stick to Peeping Toms, 52 J. MO. B. 345, 345 (1996). The term 
“Peeping Tom” derives from the legend of Lady Godiva, whose husband, the Earl of 
Mercia, promised to repeal ruinous taxes that he’d levied on the citizens of Coventry 
if she dared to ride through the town’s market on horseback nude. See RONALD 
AQUILLA CLARKE & PATRICK A.E. DAY, LADY GODIVA: IMAGES OF A LEGEND IN ART & 
SOCIETY 8 (1982). The legend was made famous by the poem of Alfred Lord 
Tennyson, where he described “one low churl . . . /Peep’d—but his eyes before they 
had their will,/Were shrivell’d into darkness in his head,/And dropt before him.” 
Alfred, Lord Tennyson, Godiva (1842). 
113 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16–11–61 (2016); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:284 (2016); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1171 (2008). 
114 LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:284. 
115 Peep, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
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visual access can be won from outside the premises does not 
mean that the regarder is entitled to the view.  Rather, the 
regarder must shift the gaze elsewhere.116 
Anti-recording laws, such as the Electronic Communication 
Privacy Act’s Wiretap Act, can also present as tactful inattention 
laws; they prohibit a person from interacting in a particular way 
with the information—the intercepting of it.117  The listener 
remains free to use the content of the information in indirect 
discourse, along the lines of “he said ‘____.’ ”  However, the 
listener may not target the speech as the object of his or her 
recording device.118 
2. Prohibiting the Use of Captured Information 
The tactful inattention paradigm can also present as the 
prohibition not of the capture or possession of sensitive 
information, but the use of it for a particular purpose.  For 
example, the crime of blackmail criminalizes the blackmailer’s 
use of embarrassing information to serve a particular purpose—
to manipulate the target.  In this context, the tactful inattention 
paradigm combats directly the abuse of access to and possession 
of sensitive information, and the imbalance in power that arises 
out of blackmail.119  Prohibiting blackmail, Solove says, “prevents  
 
 
 
116 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16–11–61 (“Peeping Tom”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
14:284 (“Peeping Tom; penalties”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14–202 (2017) (“peep[ing] 
secretly into any room occupied by another person”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16–17–470 
(2018) (“[e]avesdropping, peeping, voyeurism”); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–130 (2018) 
(“[p]eeping or spying into a dwelling or enclosure”). 
117 Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2012). Not only does the Wiretap Act 
prohibit the intercepting of specified communications, it forbids one from using data 
that one knows has been recorded in violation of the Act. Also, note that the statute 
forbids the use of data you know has been illegally recorded. Id. § 2511(c). This 
provision has faced constitutional challenges. Compare Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 
514 (2001) (individual who had played no role in illegally intercepting a 
communication could not be liable for broadcasting it where it concerned matters of 
public concern) with Boehner v. McDermott, 484 F.3d 573 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (First 
Amendment did not preclude enforcement of provision against a Congressman who 
obtained tape of a telephone conversation where he was a member of the 
Congressional Ethics Committee, which subjected him to independent nondisclosure 
rules). 
118 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2511. 
119 See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 543 
(2006) [hereinafter Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy] (“With blackmail, the harm is not 
in the actual disclosure of the information, but the control exercised by the one who 
makes the threat over the data subject.”). 
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people from taking advantage of us with our personal 
information.”120  It also requires the blackmailer to “inattend” the 
sensitive information—though perhaps not exactly “tactfully.”121 
In terms of regulating personal identity, false impersonation 
laws, which are precursors to modern state identity theft 
prohibitions,122 also exemplify a sort of tactful inattention model.  
That is, the statutes generally do not criminalize the acquisition 
of the data,123 or its disclosure, but its specific use for identified 
purposes, such as to obtain something of value.124 
Tactful inattention is also a feature of evidence law, where a 
jury might be instructed that a specific item of information may 
be considered for one purpose, but may not be considered for 
another.125 
In the civil context, a typical trade secrets law may forbid 
one from using a trade secret known to a person if that person 
knows, or should know, that the trade secret was acquired 
improperly.126  As Professor Sharon Sandeen writes, the doctrine 
of “relative secrecy” allows for information to continue to benefit 
from the trade secret doctrine even when known by several 
individuals or entities.127  The fact that someone outside the 
 
120 Id. at 544. 
121 See supra Introduction. 
122 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16–30 ( West 2018) (defining “identity 
theft” and “aggravated identity theft”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.80 (MCKINNEY 2008) 
(defining “identity theft in the first degree”). But see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/16–31(a) (defining the crime of “transmission of personal identifying information,” 
which applies when “information is photographed or otherwise captured, recorded, 
distributed, disseminated, or transmitted” without the consent of the person about 
whom the information pertains). This would exemplify the “secrecy” paradigm 
rather than the “tactful inattention” paradigm. 
123 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 529 (West 2018) (originally enacted in 1872); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.02 (West 2018) (originally enacted in 1868); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
CH. 266, § 71 (West 2018). 
124 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 529; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.02; MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 71. 
125 FED. R. EVID. 105 provides that “[i]f the court admits evidence that is 
admissible against a party or for a purpose—but not against another party or for 
another purpose—the court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its 
proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.” Some scholars have expressed 
skepticism about the efficacy of curative or limiting instructions. See, e.g., Dan 
Simon, More Problems with Criminal Trials: The Limited Effectiveness of Legal 
Mechanisms, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 167, 177–180 (2012). 
126 See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/2(b)(1) (West 2018) (defining 
misappropriation). 
127 Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can Learn 
from Trade Secret Law, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 696 (2006). She describes the 
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“backstage area” now possesses the trade secret does not destroy 
the protection.  Somewhat similarly, the Fourth Amendment’s 
exclusionary rule prohibits the use of information acquired 
through an unconstitutional search, at least in some 
circumstances.128 
The need for tactful inattention often occurs as a result of a 
secondary use of information, which in Professor Solove’s 
taxonomy is “the use of data for purposes unrelated to the 
purposes for which the data was originally collected without the 
data subject’s consent.”129  Professor Solove identifies the harm 
from secondary use as a “dignitary harm,” arguing that 
“[s]econdary uses thwart people’s expectations about how the 
data they give out will be used.”130  Furthermore, he notes that 
data that is “removed from the original context in which it was 
collected . . . can more readily be misunderstood.”131  The Fair 
Information Practices set out by the U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare incorporate this limit of secondary use by 
providing that “[t]here must be a way for an individual to prevent 
information about him obtained for one purpose from being used 
or made available for other purposes without his consent.”132  The 
federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 implements this 
limitation on secondary use by making it “unlawful for any 
person knowingly to obtain or disclose personal information, from 
a motor vehicle record, for any use not permitted [by the Act].”133  
This type of required tactful inattention has also been called “use 
regulation.”134 
 
 
 
law as “recogniz[ing] legal rights in the originator . . . depend[ing] upon the 
circumstances of disclosure.” Id. at 697. 
128 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
129 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 129–33 (2008). 
130 Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 119, at 521. 
131 Id.  
132 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE 
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 41 (1973). 
133 Driver’s Privacy Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2722 (2012). 
134 Chris Jay Hoofnagle, The Potemkinism of Privacy Pragmatism: Civil 
Liberties Are Too Important To Be Left to the Technologists, SLATE (Sept. 2, 2014, 
8:36 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/09/data_use_ 
regulation_the_libertarian_push_behind_a_new_take_on_privacy.html. 
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C. Modern Adoptions of Tactful Inattention in Law 
This part discusses four areas of modern legislation that 
incorporate the tactful inattention paradigm. 
1. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (the 
“GINA”) is an example of the tactful inattention and secrecy 
paradigms working together within a single law.135  The GINA 
requires covered entities to keep genetic information confidential, 
subject to certain limited exceptions, a secrecy paradigm 
feature.136  But it also acknowledges that sometimes such data 
may be revealed, and steps forward to limit the use of such 
information by prohibiting employers from discriminating 
against employees because of genetic information.137  The 
legislators who passed the GINA seemed to recognize that some 
prohibited uses of genetic information may be rational, even 
otherwise beneficial to the user, but that nonetheless, other 
values—including privacy—outweigh that justification.138 
2. The Fair Credit Reporting Act 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) also uses features of 
both the tactful inattention paradigm and the secrecy paradigm, 
showing that they are not entirely exclusive, but can complement 
each other.  The FCRA prohibits consumer reporting agencies 
from reporting some adverse information that Congress 
designated as obsolete.139  Thus, in general, an agency may not 
insert into consumer reports certain adverse items of information  
 
 
 
 
135 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-11 (2012). 
136 Id. § 2000ff-5. 
137 Id. § 2000ff-1(a) (prohibiting discrimination by employers); Id. § 2000ff-2(a) 
(prohibiting discrimination by employment agencies); Id. § 2000ff-3(a) (prohibiting 
discrimination by labor organizations); 29 C.F.R. § 1635.9(a) (2016) (requiring 
confidentiality, prohibiting disclosure). 
138 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (defining certain prohibited employment practices 
based on genetic information). Solove notes that there’s a purpose in prohibiting the 
penalization of “people for things they cannot control.” Solove, A Taxonomy of 
Privacy, supra note 119, at 533. 
139 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (2012). 
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it has acquired that are more than seven years old.140  However, 
the FCRA reinstates obsolete information’s eligibility for certain 
large-scale transactions and employment.141 
The FCRA’s obsolescence provisions illustrate the tactful 
inattention paradigm by prohibiting consumer reporting agencies 
from publicizing information that they may have acquired about 
a consumer.142  The provisions also have features of the secrecy 
paradigm in that the agencies must keep such information secret 
while simultaneously averting their eyes from it. 
3. Pre-Existing Employee “Lifestyle” Laws 
Many states prevent employers from freely using 
information about an employee’s personal activities that they 
might come across (or scour for) against such employees; 
sometimes employers are forbidden from even keeping a record of 
them. 
For example, the state of Michigan forbids employers from 
“gather[ing] or keep[ing] a record of an employee’s associations, 
political activities, publications, or communication of 
nonemployment activities.”143  However, the statute does permit 
employers to monitor such activities that occur on the employers’ 
premises or during working hours and that “interfere with the 
performance of the employee’s duties or duties of other 
employees.”144  Similarly, New York protects a broad category of 
employee “recreational activities,” from employer discrimination, 
including “sports, games, hobbies, exercise, reading and the  
 
 
 
140 Id. § 1681c(a)(5). Criminal convictions are exempt from the prohibition. Id. 
§ 1681c(a)(5). And bankruptcies don’t become stale until after ten years. Id. The Fair 
Credit Reporting Act provides specific designations for the time from which the 
identified period runs for bankruptcies, civil suits, civil judgments, records of arrest, 
paid tax liens, and accounts placed for collection that help determine when the 
seven-year period starts. Id. § 1681c(a)(1)–(4), (c). These obsolescence provisions 
have withstood a First Amendment challenge. King v. Gen. Info. Servs., 903 F. Supp. 
2d 303, 306, 313 (E.D. Pa. 2012). The obsolescence provisions pertain only to 
negative information; the Act does not restrict the reporting of old positive 
information. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681c. 
141 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(b). 
142 Id. § 1681c(a). 
143 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.508(1) (West 2018). 
144 Id. 
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viewing of television, movies and similar material.”145  Other 
states with similar laws include Montana,146 North Dakota,147 and 
Colorado.148 
These laws express the tactful inattention paradigm by 
acknowledging implicitly that personal information not 
sufficiently impinging on that employee’s work should not play a 
role in the employers’ assessments.  Employers must avert their 
eyes from such information, regardless of the efforts or lack 
thereof―the employee has made to hide the information.  In this 
way, these lifestyle laws are a model for similar laws. 
4. Employer Use of Credit Reports and Criminal Records 
Recently, states have begun to regulate the use by employers 
of their applicants’ credit reports and even their criminal records.  
This background information is often easily available from 
consumer reporting agencies, and certainly the federal FCRA 
permits such investigation by employers.149  However, some 
states have recognized that even though certain information may 
be accessible, it nonetheless should not always play a role in 
 
145 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(1)(b) (MCKINNEY 2018). New York permits employers 
to allow themselves to be influenced by such activities if they occur during working 
hours or on the employer’s premises, and also where the activities “create[] a 
material conflict of interest related to the employer’s . . . business interest.” Id. 
§ 201-d(3)(a). Other exceptions also exist. Id. § 201-d(3)(b)-(e). 
146 MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5) (West 2017) (generally prohibiting 
employers from firing employees without “good cause,” and specifically identifying 
“[t]he legal use of a lawful product by an individual off the employer’s premises 
during nonworking hours” as not being a good cause). As is typical of such laws, an 
employer may act upon that information in certain narrow circumstances where the 
employer’s interests are affected. Id. § 39-2-313. 
147 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-03 (West 2017) (designating as a 
“discriminatory practice” the making of employment decisions because of an 
employee’s “participation in lawful activity off the employer’s premises during 
nonworking hours” so long as the activity is “not in direct conflict with the essential 
business-related interests of the employer”). 
148 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402.5(1) (West 2018) (declaring it an “unfair 
employment practice” for an employer to terminate employment because of “lawful 
activity” that occurs off the employer’s premises and during nonworking hours 
unless the restriction either “[r]elates to a bona fide occupational requirement or is 
reasonably and rationally related to the employment activities and responsibilities 
of a particular employee or a particular group of employees” or “[i]s necessary to 
avoid a conflict of interest” or the appearance of such with the employer’s 
responsibilities). 
149 See  Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(B) (2012) (permitting 
consumer reporting agencies to furnish consumer reports to those who “intend[] to 
use the information for employment purposes”). The act imposes conditions on the 
agencies for furnishing such reports, though. Id. § 1681b(b). 
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employment decisions.150  Below, employer use of credit reports is 
discussed first, followed by employer use of criminal record 
information. 
a. Employer Use of Credit Reports 
The tactful inattention paradigm appears in recent state 
laws that limit employers from considering applicants’ credit 
reports in making hiring decisions.  California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, 
Oregon, Vermont, and Washington have all passed credit history 
cloaking measures.151  In addition, Washington, D.C. 
incorporated such a limitation into its human rights law.152 
Credit history cloaking laws have some common features.  In 
general, the statutes apply to similar types of information—a 
report that contains information about the applicant’s credit 
history.153  The strictest laws prohibit employers from even 
obtaining a report, implementing tactful inattention by requiring 
the averting of eyes up front.154  Typically, they forbid employers 
from acting on the contents of a credit report—that is, 
discriminating on the basis of credit information.155  Connecticut 
 
150 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.20.5 (West 2018); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5 (West 
2018); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-126 (West 2018); COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 1103-4:1, 
1103-4:12 (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt (West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
19, § 711(g) (West 2018); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2(a)(8) (West 2017); 820 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/5, 70/30 (West 2018); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 3-711 
(West 2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.570 (West 2017); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 659A.320 (West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i (West 2018); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 19.182.020(2)(c) (West 2018). 
151 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.20.5; CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5; COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 8-2-126; COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 1103-4:1, 1103-4:12; CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 31-51tt; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(g); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-
2(a)(8); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/5, 70/30; MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 3-
711; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.570; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.320; VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21, § 495i; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.020(2)(c). 
152 D.C. Code Ann. § 2-14-2.11(a)(4)(D) (West 2018) (text applicable upon the 
date of inclusion of its fiscal effect in an approved budget and financial plan). 
153 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.20.5(a); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/5; MD. CODE ANN. LAB. 
& EMPL. § 3-711(b); VT. STAT. ANN. § 495i(a)(2), (3); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 19.182.010(4). 
154 D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-14-2.11(a)(4)(D) (forbidding employers from, among 
other acts, “us[ing] . . . an employee’s credit information”); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 659A.320(1); VT. STAT. ANN. § 495i(b)(2) (forbidding employers from 
“[i]nquir[ing] about an applicant or employee’s credit report or credit history”); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.020(c). 
155 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(g)(1); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 378-2(a)(8); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/10(a); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & 
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has the weakest prohibition.  It merely bars employers from 
requiring an employee or applicant to consent to a request for a 
credit report but does not prohibit an employer from making the 
request, even though applicants might not feel free to deny it.156  
It can perhaps be characterized as a suggestion that the 
employer avert its eyes, putting more of a burden on the holder of 
the key to the information—the employee or applicant who must 
consent—to withhold the information’s accessibility by denying 
consent.157 
The tactful inattention paradigm is evident in different ways 
in these laws.  Essentially, the laws tell employers that even 
though information about an applicant or employee is available, 
nonetheless they must avert their eyes from it or, if they see it, 
must avoid using it in making their human resources decisions. 
Of course, these prohibitions have exceptions, some of which 
threaten to swamp the rule.158  Still, these laws acknowledge 
 
EMP. § 3-711(b), (c) (use for a non-prohibited purpose); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 659A.320(1); 21 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i(b). Nevada comes close to 
prohibiting the acquisition of a report, forbidding employers from inquiring 
concerning a consumer credit report. NEV. REV. STAT. § 613(7)(3). 
156 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b). 
157 Id. 
158 For instance, most of the laws exempt some types of management positions. 
CAL LAB. CODE § 1024.5(a)(1); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(a)(4)(A) (managerial 
positions), (C) (fiduciary positions); MD. CODE ANN. LAB & EMPL. § 3-711(c)(2)(i); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.580(3)(c) (West 2017); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/10(b)(4) 
(exempting those positions for which “a satisfactory credit history is an established 
bona fide occupational requirement,” a feature that requires the presence of at least 
one of seven designated circumstances, one of which is that the position is 
managerial); VT. STAT. ANN. § 495i(c)(1)(E) (positions requiring “a financial fiduciary 
responsibility to the employer or a client of the employer”); see also HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 378-2.7(a)(1) (credit history is related to a bona fide occupational 
requirement and the employee has received a conditional offer of employment), 
id. § 378-2.7(a)(3) (the position is managerial or supervisory). Other positions 
commonly exempted include those with financial institutions or that involve 
monetary transactions. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5(b) (institutions covered by 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809); id. § 1024.5(a)(5)(A)-(C) 
(access to bank or credit card information along with an individual’s date of birth 
and Social Security Number, excluding routine credit card transactions); id. 
§ 1024.5(a)(8) (positions involving regular access to cash totaling $10,000 or more); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b) (financial institutions); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-
1402.11(d)(6) (West 2018) (duties of the position “involves access to personal 
financial information”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.7(a)(4); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 70/5 (excluding from the definition of “employer”), 70/10(b)(2), (3) (duties of the 
position include access to cash or assets worth $2500 or more, or signatory power 
over assets of $100 or more); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 3-711(c)(2)(iii) (involves 
a fiduciary responsibility, including collecting payments, and for those who are 
provided an expense account or corporate debit or credit card); NEV. REV. 
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that, with our information, an attitude of “finders-keepers” 
toward sensitive information may not strike the sort of balance 
that will allow individuals to fully flourish.159 
b. Employers’ Use of Criminal Record Information 
The tactful inattention paradigm also appears in recent state 
legislation restricting private employers from inquiring into or 
considering the criminal record of job applicants.  The practice is 
common: a 2012 survey by the Society for Human Resource 
Management reveals that 69% of employers investigate the 
criminal background of every applicant.160  Such public record 
information has become much more widely available.  At one 
time, a comprehensive criminal background check would have 
required a county-by-county visit to clerk counters across the 
country, but now,  many records are available online so that an 
individual’s record can be checked from a desk, or even a 
smartphone.161 
While it seems intuitively obvious why employers would 
want to know of any criminal taint on an applicant’s past, 
employee advocates worry that a criminal record—even a single 
record of arrest—can unjustifiably isolate a candidate from 
positions that do not necessarily require an unblemished 
background.162  The numbers of those affected are not small: 8.6% 
of American adults have a felony conviction, and approximately 
65 million Americans have some kind of criminal record.163  
Accordingly, advocacy groups such as the National Employment  
 
 
 
 
STAT. § 613.570 (3)(a); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.320(2)(a) (federally insured 
banks or credit unions); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495i(c)(1)(B), (C), (G); (access to 
confidential financial information and the employer’s payroll, respectively). 
159 See supra text accompanying notes 153–57 . 
160 Society for Human Resource Management, SHRM Survey Findings: 
Background Checking—The Use of Criminal Background Checks in Hiring 
Decisions, SLIDESHARE (August 15, 2012), http://www.slideshare.net/shrm/2012-
backgroundcheck-criminalfinal (turn to page three on the slideshow). 
161 FTC, FTC Warns Marketers That Mobile Apps May Violate Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/02/mobileapps.shtm. 
162 Am. Civil Liberties Union et al, State Reforms Reducing Consequences for 
People with Criminal Records: 2011-2012 Legislative Round-Up, NAT’L EMP’T LAW 
PROJECT 1 (Sept. 2012), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/StateColl 
ateralConsequencesLegislativeRoundupSept2012.pdf.pdf. 
163 Id. 
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Law Project have urged states to reform their employment laws 
to reduce the impact of a criminal background on an applicant’s 
candidacy.164 
Responding to such concerns, some state credit reporting 
statutes restrict agencies from putting certain criminal record 
information into consumer reports.165  These restrictions vary 
widely.  New York, with one of the more robust provisions, flatly 
prohibits agencies from reporting criminal arrest information for 
past charges unless the individual was convicted of the offense.166  
Furthermore, the state prohibits the reporting of criminal 
convictions more than seven years old unless an exception 
applies.167  Similarly, California prohibits not only the reporting 
of criminal record information that is more than seven years old, 
but also the reporting of any pardoned convictions or other 
arrests, indictments, or similar information where no conviction 
followed.168  Nonetheless, exclusions of criminal record 
information are often themselves subject to an exclusion, 
returning such information to an employee’s credit report.169 
 However, even where criminal record information is 
available on an applicant’s background checks or similar credit 
report, some states limit what employers may ask about or 
consider in terms of an applicant’s criminal record.170  This is a 
tactful inattention approach because the information may be 
available to an employer, but the employer must take efforts to 
avoid looking at it or considering it.  States with restrictions on 
private employers include California,171 Hawaii,172 Illinois,173 
 
164 Id. 
165 See infra text accompanying notes 166–69. 
166 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW. § 380-j(a)(1) (McKinney 2018). The statute does permit 
a consumer reporting agency to disclose the detention of the consumer by a retail 
mercantile establishment so long as he or she has executed an uncoerced admission 
of wrongdoing, and received a prescribed notice from the establishment. Id. § 380-
j(b). 
167 Id. § 380-j(f)(1)(v). 
168 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.13(a)(6) (West 2018). 
169 See supra text accompanying notes 165–68. 
170 See infra notes 171–75. 
171 CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7 (West 2018) (forbidding employers from asking an 
applicant to disclose information regarding arrests or detentions that did not result 
in conviction, and prohibiting employers from seeking such information, but 
designating exceptions). 
172 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5 (West 2017). 
173 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 75/10, 75/15 (West 2018) (applying to private 
employers with fifteen or more employees, and prohibiting them from inquiring into 
or considering an applicant’s criminal history until the applicant has been deemed 
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Massachusetts,174 Minnesota,175 New Jersey,176 and Rhode 
Island.177  Hawaii’s statute, for example, provides that an 
employer may “inquire about and consider an individual’s 
criminal conviction record” only after the prospective employee 
has received a conditional offer of employment, and only where 
“the conviction record bears a rational relationship to the duties 
and responsibilities of the position.”178  Some states have enacted 
provisions restricting criminal history inquiries for positions in 
public agencies, as opposed to those with private employers.179 
Here, too, the tactful inattention paradigm appears.  
Criminal records are, after all, public records, available in many 
states online, and even on smartphone apps that are available to 
 
qualified and either has been notified of an interview or has received a conditional 
offer of employment). 
174 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(9 ½) (West 2018) (prohibiting 
employers from requesting criminal record information on initial application forms, 
though with certain exceptions). 
175 MINN. ST. ANN. § 364.021 (West 2018) (prohibiting private employers from 
inquiring into or considering an applicant’s criminal record history, also with certain 
specific exceptions). 
176 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:6B-11–34:6B-14 (West 2018) (prohibiting employers 
with fifteen or more employees, and prohibiting employers from asking about an 
applicant’s criminal record “during the initial employment application process”). 
177 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-7 (West 2017). 
178 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5 (West 2017). As an example of a weaker 
protection, Rhode Island merely prohibits employers from including questions as to 
an applicant’s criminal record on employment applications, while permitting 
employers to ask applicants about criminal convictions (though apparently not about 
arrests or charges not resulting in convictions) at the first interview or later. R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-7. 
179 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-5-101 (West 2018) (limiting the 
consideration of a criminal record in applicants for public employment); CONN. GEN 
STAT. ANN. § 46a-80 (West 2018) (providing that an applicant will not be disqualified 
from employment by the state “solely because of a prior conviction of a crime,” with 
exceptions); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(g)(1) (West 2018) (prohibiting public 
employers from inquiring into or considering the criminal record or history, along 
with credit history or credit score, during the initial application process, with 
exceptions); MD. CODE ANN. STATE PERS. & PENS. § 2-203 (West 2018) (effective July 
1, 2018, and prohibiting public employers (with exceptions) from inquiring into an 
applicant’s criminal history until after the applicant has been provided an 
opportunity to interview); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-202 (West 2018) (prohibiting 
public employers from asking for an applicant’s criminal history “until the public 
employer has determined the applicant meets the minimum employment 
qualifications,” providing exceptions); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-2-3 (West 2018) 
(prohibiting public employers from considering misdemeanor convictions not 
involving moral turpitude and arrest records not followed by conviction, and further 
prohibiting such employers from inquiring about criminal convictions on initial 
applications and from considering them before the applicant has been selected as a 
finalist). 
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all.180  Similarly, the FCRA permits employers, among others, to 
access employees’ credit reports and expressly acknowledges that 
employment purposes are justifiable reasons to access a credit 
report.181  Such state limits on access express the belief that 
simply because data exists and one has the means to grab it, does 
not mean one should grab it—no peeping permitted. 
Even when a statute eventually permits a peek at a criminal 
record, such as Hawaii’s provision,182 the statute requires tactful 
inattention until the employer has a concrete reason to “attend” 
to this aspect of an employee or candidate’s past. 
III. EMERGING AREAS OF TACTFUL INATTENTION IN LAW 
The tactful inattention paradigm offers a possible path for 
protecting privacy in the big data age.  Instead of requiring 
individuals to make Herculean efforts to avoid dribbling data, we 
instead can require observers to make modest efforts to avoid 
peeping at or using, it.183  We can, in effect, require the use of 
virtual blinkers, and, as discussed above, have done so both 
traditionally and recently. 
A. Employers’ Examination of Social Media 
One area of conflict that could benefit from a tactful 
inattention paradigm is the use by employers of the information 
employees and applicants put on social media such as Facebook 
and Twitter.  Requiring employers to limit their gaze on and 
their use of such information would allow individuals to fully 
benefit from these new technologies and the relationships that 
they underlie and promote, without having to hide the 
information from those who might use it to harm them.184 
 
180 See, e.g., In re Filiquarian Publ’g, LLC, No. C-4401 (Apr. 30, 2013) (decision 
and order), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/05/130501filq 
uariando.pdf. 
181 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(B) (2012). 
182 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5(a)-(b) (West 2018). 
183 Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a 
Networked World, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559, 599–600 (2015). 
184 Josh Eidelson, Can You Be Fired for What You Post on Facebook?, SLATE 
(July 3, 2012, 4:40 PM), http://slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence 
/2012/07/getting_fired_for_what_you_post_on_facebook.html. Labor law has already 
intervened to regulate the use by employers of employees’ Facebook 
communications; the NLRB found firings for Facebook use by employees discussing 
complaints about their jobs. Design Tech. Grp., LLC, No. 20-CA-035511 (2017), 2017 
WL 4925473 (N.L.R.B.), at *1. 
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Employers might want to view an employee’s social media 
activities for several reasons.  Employers may want to be sure 
that an employee is not disparaging the workplace, may want to 
monitor communications in order to comply with a statute or 
regulation,185 or may want to exploit employees’ social media 
accounts to advertise a business’s products and service.186  
Nonetheless, a great deal of potential postings from individuals 
will fall well outside any of those legitimate areas of concern, and 
requiring tactful inattention to media activities in which the 
employer does not have a sufficient and legitimate interest 
protects the employee’s privacy while still addressing an 
employer’s legitimate concerns. 
Currently, several states expressly prohibit employers from 
requiring applicants to provide personal passwords to 
employers.187  In addition, a few states prohibit an employer from 
compelling an employee to access a personal online account in 
the employer’s presence, that is, “shoulder surfing.”188  These 
 
185 See, e.g., Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Social Media Web Sites: Guidance on 
Blogs and Social Networking Web Sites, REG. NOTICE (Jan. 2010), 
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p120779.pdf. 
186 See Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Workplace Privacy, Data Management & Security 
Report: States Continue To Protect the Personal Social Media Accounts of Employees, 
with Oregon Likely to Add an Interesting Twist (May 28, 2015), 
http://www.workplaceprivacyreport.com/2015/05/articles/workplace-privacy/states-
continue-to-protect-the-personal-social-media-accounts-of-employees-with-oregon-
likely-to-add-an-interesting-twist/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed& 
utm_campaign=Feed%3A+WorkplacePrivacyDataManagementSecurityReport+%28
Workplace+Privacy%2C+Data+Management+%26+Security+Report%29. 
187 ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124 (West 2018); CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (West 2018); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-127 (West 2018) (password prohibition limited to access 
through the employee’s or applicant’s “personal electronic communication device”); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-40X (West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 709A (West 
2018); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/10 (West 2018); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1951–1955 
(West 2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 616–619 (2017); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & 
EMPL. § 3-712 (West 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.278 (West 2018); NEB. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-3503 (West 2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.135 (West 
2017); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:74(II) (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:6B-5–10 
(West 2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-34 (West 2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
40, §§ 173.2, 173.3 (West 2018); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.330 (West 2018); 28 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-56-1-6 (West 2017); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1-1001–1004 
(West 2018); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-48-101–301 (West 2018); VIR. CODE 
ANN. § 40.1-28.7:5(B) (West 2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.44.200, 205 (West 
2018); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.55 (West 2017). 
188 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.330(1)(c) (2015); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 50-1-1003(a)(3) (2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.200(1)(b) (West 2013); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.55(2)(a)(1); see also Susan Park, Employee Internet Privacy: A 
Proposed Act That Balances Legitimate Employer Rights and Employee Privacy, 51 
AM. BUS. L.J. 779, 790 (2014). 
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model tactful inattention by prohibiting employers from 
demanding “key” information that they know would provide them 
access to personal information about the employee. 
In addition to prohibiting employers from asking an 
employee or applicant for a social media password, many of the 
statutes provide that employers who inadvertently receive an 
employee’s login information may not use it to log into the 
employee’s account.189  This is an example of a statute requiring 
tactful inattention to information within one’s reach. 
Such laws reflect that given modern social media, 
information that individuals may have once shared over a phone 
or in a face-to-face conversation, hidden from the employer’s 
gaze, may now appear on social media, where an employer may 
be able to access it, at least with the employee’s credentials.  But 
these laws help stem the pullback on privacy of these advances in 
communication, imposing on employers a duty to avoid peeping.  
The information may be available in the cybersphere, but that 
does not mean that employers have a right to access it, and if 
they do get their hands on the “key” to it, they may not exploit 
that power to access. 
B. Use of Consumers’ Online Information by Political 
Campaigns and Vendors 
While employers may want to surveil their employees to 
keep them in check, political campaigns and vendors may want 
to obtain individuals’ data to manipulate their votes and their 
purchases.  The power and availability of such data calls for 
tactful inattention. 
In 2015, Dr. Aleksandr Kogan, a professor at Cambridge 
University, sought data from Facebook for an app he created 
called “mydigitallife,” which purported to be a personality 
assessment for use by psychologists.190  Facebook claimed that 
 
189 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124(b)(3); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
55/10(b)(4); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:1953(C); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-3510; N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 275:74(V); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 173.2(C); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 659A.330(6); VIR. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-28.5(C), 28.7(C) (West 2018); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.200(4); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-5H-1(c) (West 2018); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 995.55(7)(d). 
190 Nicole Banas, Facebook Execs Liable for “Massive” Data Scandal, Investor 
Suit Says, WESTLAW SECS. ENFORCEMENT & LITIG. DAILY BRIEFING, 2018 WL 
1473644 (Mar. 27, 2018). 
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Dr. Kogan said he wanted the data for academic purposes.191  But 
Dr. Kogan had been hired by Cambridge Analytica, a political 
consulting firm, the month the company was founded by Stephen 
Bannon192 with Robert Mercer, a Republican party donor.193  Mr. 
Bannon later became chief White House strategist to President 
Trump.194  Dr. Kogan’s app provided Cambridge Analytica access 
to 87 million Facebook users’ data,195 which it used to influence 
voters to support Trump’s candidacy.196  Under the secrecy 
paradigm, a data broker may use the data without restriction.  In 
contrast, a tactful inattention approach might require those that 
possess social media users’ search, “like,” and posting 
information to refrain from using it in such ways. 
Such an approach appears in a Congressional bill drafted in 
response to the Cambridge Analytica scandal by Senators 
Markey and Blumenthal.197  Somewhat cumbersomely entitled 
the “Customer Online Notification for Stopping Edge-provider 
Network Transgressions Act” (the “CONSENT Act”), the bill 
would require data sellers, called “edge providers” in the bill,198 
 
191 Matthew Rosenberg et al., How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook 
Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html. 
192 Matthew Rosenberg, Professor Apologizes for Helping Cambridge Analytica 
Harvest Facebook Data, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/04/22/business/media/cambridge-analytica-aleksandr-kogan.html. 
193 William Booth & Karla Adam, Cambridge Analytica’s Alexander Nix: Bong 
Villain, Tech Genius, or Hustler?, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/cambridge-analyticas-alexander-nix-
bond-villain-tech-genius-or-hustler/2018/03/27/14c99112-2e34-11e8-8dc9-
3b51e028b845_story.html?utm_term=.c672d64a3831. 
194 Jose A. DelReal, Trump Draws Sharp Rebuke, Concerns over Newly 
Appointed Chief White House Strategist Stephen Bannon, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/11/13/trump-
draws-sharp-rebuke-concerns-over-newly-appointed-chief-white-house-
strategist/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9e145906f9a9. 
195 Sarah Emerson, Mark Zuckerberg: “It Was My Mistake” Facebook 
Compromised Data of 87 Million Users, MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 4, 2018, 5:44 PM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/7xdw99/mark-zuckerberg-it-was-my-
mistake-facebook-compromised-data-of-87-million-users. 
196 Rosenberg et al., supra note 191. The company created profiles based on 
individual features such as age, gender, ethnicity, race, income, advertising 
resonance, consumer and lifestyle data, and political engagement. Mark Andrus, The 
New Oil: The Right To Control One’s Identity in Light of the Commoditization of the 
Individual, A.B.A. BUS. L. TODAY (Sept. 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/business_law/publications/blt/2017/09/06_andrus.html. 
197 S. 2639, 115th Cong. (2017–2018). 
198 The bill defines “edge provider[s]” as those providing an “edge service,” which 
is one provided over the Internet that meets any of four criteria, including one 
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to, among other requirements, “obtain opt-in consent from a 
customer to use, share, or sell the sensitive customer propriety 
information.”199  Furthermore, the bill would restrict a preferred 
dodge around such privacy provisions, whereby service providers 
simply deny the service to non-compliant customers; the bill 
would prohibit an edge provider from imposing “take-it-or-leave-
it” conditions on the customer.200  Thus, services like Facebook 
would have to gain customers’ explicit permission to sell their 
information to third parties such as Dr. Kogan—a tactful 
inattention to the content of such information and its commercial 
value. 
While the federal response is at present merely a bill, the 
state of California responded to the Cambridge Analytica scandal 
with an emphatic and powerful privacy law, the California 
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018.201  Under it, certain businesses202 
must, upon request provide information about their general 
collection practices to consumers, including information about 
the categories and specific pieces of personal information203 the 
business has collected.204  Furthermore, consumers have the right 
to request businesses to delete any collected personal 
information.205  Those businesses that sell consumers’ personal 
information or disclose it for business purposes also must, upon 
request, disclose to the consumer what they collected and sold 
 
“through which a customer divulges sensitive customer proprietary information.” Id. 
§ 2(a)(4), (5). 
199 The bill does not impose this requirement directly on edge providers; rather, 
the bill calls for the Federal Trade Commission to promulgate regulations that 
impose such a requirement. Id. § 2(b)(2)(A), (B)(iii). 
200 Id. § 2(b)(2)(A), (B)(vi). 
201 California Privacy Act of 2018, ch. 55, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West), as 
amended by 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 735 (to be codified CAL. CIV. 
CODE §§ 1798.100–198) (adding title 1.81.5 to part 4 of division 3 of the Civil Code). 
The Act becomes effective January 1, 2020. Id. § 3 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1798.198(a)). The Act refers explicitly to the Cambridge Analytica 
revelations. Id. § 2(g). 
202 The Act defines “business[es]” to mean designated organizations “operated 
for profit or financial benefit . . . that collect[] consumers’ personal information” and 
that meet one of three specified thresholds. Id. § 3 (to be codified at CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1798.140(c)). 
203 This term is defined quite broadly to include identifiers, biometric 
information, and “Internet or other electronic activity information,” among other 
items. Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)). However, the term 
excludes “publicly available information.” Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 1798.140(o)(2)). 
204 Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100, 1798.110). 
205 Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(a)). 
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about that consumer.206  As a key matter, consumers can opt-out 
of the sale by a business of their personal information,207 and 
businesses may not discriminate against consumers who exercise 
their rights, although a business may charge different prices or 
provide different levels of quality if the “difference is reasonably 
related to the value provided to the consumer by the consumer’s 
data,” a potentially enormous loophole.208  Nonetheless, 
California’s Consumer Privacy Act represents a potent tactful 
inattention approach to maintaining the privacy of individual’s 
digital data. 
While political campaigns may seek a consumer’s individual 
information to amass power, vendors and advertisers seek it to 
create a picture of a consumer’s personality to market goods and 
services, tailor responses,209 and even create “boutique” pricing, 
individually targeted to leverage the most money out of any given 
consumer.210  Relatedly, the burgeoning field of “neuromarketing” 
seeks to study brain activity in response to stimuli to understand 
consumer preferences.211  Advertisers increasingly make 
secondary use of information that they think gives cues as to an 
individual’s personality to shape advertising and target that 
individual in a manner that the advertisers think will be 
specifically appealing.212  Such personality profiling may not 
always necessarily hurt a given consumer, but laws in the mode 
of tactful inattention could help skew such uses to the consumer’s 
benefit and away from the consumer’s detriment. 
 
206 Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.115(a)). 
207 Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120(a)). 
208 Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.125(a)(1), (2)). The bill specifically 
lists the denial of goods or services, the charging of different prices, and the 
providing of different levels of goods or services among the prohibited acts of 
discrimination. Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.125(a)(A)–(C)). However, 
businesses may offer financial incentives. Id. (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 
1798.125(b)). 
209 See infra text accompanying notes 213–14. 
210 See infra text accompanying note 216. 
211 See Sandra Blakeslee, If Your Brain Has a “Buy Button,” What Pushes It?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2004), https://nytimes.com/2004/10/19/science/if-your-brain-has-
a-buybutton-what-pushes-it.html; G. A. Calvert & M. J. Brammer, Predicting 
Consumer Behavior: Using Novel Mind-Reading Approaches, PubMed ID 22678839 
(describing advances in medical learning to help improve “greater accuracy of 
prediction in terms of consumer acceptance of new brands, products, and 
campaigns”). 
212 See, e.g., Joanna Penn, Behavioral Advertising: The Cryptic Hunter and 
Gatherer of the Internet, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 599, 601 (2012). 
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For instance, an advertiser could use consumer-specific 
purchasing patterns to target a particular consumer and 
manipulate him or her into behavior more favorable to a 
particular merchant.  A scenario sketched by Professor Tal Z. 
Zarsky illustrates the kind of manipulation that a savvy seller 
could engage in, one who notices that a consumer has stopped 
buying cigarettes and has bought a nicotine patch.213  Deducing 
that the consumer seeks to cease smoking, the merchant could 
target him with cigarette ads and even free cigarettes.214 
Vendors could also use such data to analyze consumer 
behavior in the marketplace, tailoring their own behavior 
towards a particular consumer.  For instance, radio frequency 
identification tags could help identify “undesirable customers” 
who “monopolize the attention of attendants” before leaving 
without buying.215  What are some other practical uses of these 
indicators of personality traits that our purchasing, surfing, and 
postings may give away?  As Professor Lior Jacob Strahilevitz 
discusses, merchants and service providers could use consumer 
data to discriminate among customers on the basis of their 
wealth in providing them services, so information privacy could 
benefit poor consumers by “thwarting” such sorting.216 
One lucrative use of information about personal preferences 
is to engage in “weblining”—charging higher prices to certain 
consumers based on the preferences revealed by their online 
activity.217  According to one study, such practices, known by 
economists as “first-degree price discrimination,” but commonly 
 
213 Tal Z. Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the 
Implications of the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public 
Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 4, 20 (2002–2003). 
214 Id. 
215 Jonathon Zittrain, Privacy 2.0, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 65, 72 (2008). 
216 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. 2010, 2029 (2013) (“Protecting privacy seems to thwart price and service 
discrimination while fostering statistical discrimination on the basis of race and 
gender and lowering production costs.”). He speculates on the implications for the 
use of big data and the political process, given that it appears that introverts are less 
likely to participate in the process. Id. at 2025. 
217 See, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: 
Regulation, Self-Regulation, or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 450–51 
(2011); Zittrain, supra note 215, at 72 (describing how information about individual 
behavior can help enable price discrimination). Some have defended the ability of 
firms to engage in this kind of price discrimination as possibly benefiting consumers 
and the market alike. See Matthew A. Edwards, Price and Prejudice: The Case 
Against Consumer Equality in the Information Age, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 
559 (2006). 
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as “dynamic pricing,” are increasing.218  By using detailed 
personal profiles of shoppers pulled from tracked data, retailers 
can “apply sophisticated pricing models to individual consumer 
profiles through automated price-setting systems in order to 
target personalized prices to individual consumers.”219 
Pricing discrimination is not a new concept.  Some states 
prohibit price discrimination under certain circumstances, 
usually in the context of a competitor’s discrimination intended 
to hinder competition.220  In addition, § 2(a) of the federal 
Robinson-Patman Act prohibits certain kinds of price 
discrimination, but without any right to a private cause of 
action.221  But the Robinson-Patman Act has not been used to 
 
218 JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., OPEN TO EXPLOITATION: AMERICAN SHOPPERS 
ONLINE AND OFFLINE 10 (Annenberg Pub. Pol’y Ctr. of Univ. of Pa. ed., 2005), 
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Turow_APPC_Repo 
rt_WEB_FINAL2.pdf. 
219 Akiva A. Miller, What Do We Worry About When We Worry About Price 
Discrimination? The Law and Ethics of Using Personal Information for Pricing, 19 J. 
TECH. L. & POL’Y 41, 49–50 (2014). The author notes that data brokers offer a 
variety of options to retailers to reach not just their own prior shoppers, but 
shoppers of competitors as well. Id. at 52. 
220 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3 6-2-103(1) (West 2018); Dunlap v. Colo. 
Springs Cablevision, Inc., 829 P.2d 1286, 1296 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (plaintiffs, 
consumers, could sue to enforce state anti-price discrimination provision even 
though scope is limited “to conduct intended to destroy or prevent primary-line 
competition”). But see Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 930 (1985) 
(affirming demurrer of deceptive trade practices act claim based on bank’s 
“ ‘arbitrary’ price discrimination” of waiving NSF charges for some customers but 
not others, reasoning that such a waiver did not “describe[] acts of unfair 
competition”). 
221 Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012). The provision states as 
follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of 
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price 
between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, 
where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in 
commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale 
within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of 
Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of 
the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be 
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line 
of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person 
who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, 
or with customers of either of them. 
Id. See also Douglas M. Kochelek, Note, Data Mining and Antitrust, 22 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 515, 523–24 (2009) (also discussing the Sherman Act’s applicability to price 
discrimination). 
 The Federal Trade Commission has sued sellers who have sold products to 
different customers at “discriminatory” prices, although these cases also seem to be 
directed to actions intended to hamper competition, as opposed to maximize profits. 
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prohibit modern “weblining” or “boutique pricing” at the 
consumer level or in the context of the new data that can 
powerfully target individuals.  As an example, Zarsky writes 
about the hypothetical situation of a wealthy philosophy student 
whose book buying behavior leads an online retailer to charge 
him more, generally, and even more during the times the seller 
has determined the student is most likely to want books.222 
This sort of use of consumer-specific information can provoke 
outrage—even in Internet-savvy consumers.  Professor William 
W. Fisher writes that consumers often respond strongly and 
negatively to such practices.223  Fisher cites Amazon.com’s 
experiment with “dynamic pricing,” whereby it was believed that 
Amazon quoted higher prices to existing Amazon customers than 
to new ones.224  In part, Fisher writes, the anger arose from the 
surreptitious use of the practice believed to have taken place.225  
Another study of consumer reactions to “dynamic pricing” found 
that between 87%–91% of the consumers surveyed disagreed 
with statements along the lines of “It [i]s OK if [a supermarket or 
online store] charges different people different prices for the 
same products during the same hour.”226 
Aside from the unfairness perception that Professor Fisher 
discusses, Professor Zarsky identifies a particular concern about 
such surreptitious use of data to profile consumers, whether to 
create a personal price or to market a particular product: it can 
be inaccurate, leading to unjust treatment of a consumer.227  In 
 
See, e.g., FTC v. Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc., 178 F. Supp. 448, 454 (S.D. Cal. 1959), 
aff’d, 286 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1960). Furthermore, some case law approves of price 
changing so long as the seller charges all competing customers the same amount at 
any given time, indicating that contemporaneous price discrimination would be 
unlawful. See, e.g., K-S Pharm., Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 962 F.2d 728, 733 
(7th Cir. 1992); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 
1406-08 (7th Cir. 1989); Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 418 F.2d 793, 806 
(9th Cir. 1969); Xi v. Apple, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 464, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). The 
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that an insurance company’s failure to disclose to 
home buyers that it had paid rebates to institutions that had bought the insurance 
on the home buyers’ behalf, thus reducing the actual cost of the insurance but 
without benefitting the buyers, could be an actionable deceptive trade practice under 
state law. Fitzgerald v. Chi. Title & Trust Co., 380 N.E.2d 790, 794–95 (Ill. 1978). 
222 Zarsky, supra note 213, at 19. 
223 William W. Fisher, III, When Should We Permit Differential Pricing of 
Information?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1, 10 (2007) (describing the perception of consumers 
to such practices as “gouging”). 
224 Id. at 11–12. 
225 Id. at 12. 
226 TUROW ET AL., supra note 218, at 22. 
227 Zarsky, supra note 213, at 47–50. 
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his hypothetical, a consumer could be charged a higher insurance 
premium simply because a consumer was erroneously classified 
as high-risk.228  In another hypothetical, an insurer wrongly 
classifies an insured as someone who enjoys high risk sports, 
inferred from her reading and web browsing activity, and 
accordingly raises her insurance premium, even though in fact 
the consumer leads a conservative life and has made her choices 
for an article she’s writing, not to enhance her own leisure 
activities.229  Such surreptitious labeling can be completely 
invisible to us, and as impossible to fix as it is to detect. 
From a tactful inattention standpoint, legislators could 
regulate the use of individual data for personality profiling, 
whether used for marketing, service tailoring, or price targeting.  
Thus, the mere fact that troves of individually identifiable 
consumer data were available, were no longer “secret,” would not 
mean that the data was fair game for simply any use a data 
miner could dream up.  Rather, legislators could accede to the 
wishes of individuals about how they want their data used, 
changing the balance of power between merchants and their 
targets.   
IV. BENEFITS OF THE TACTFUL INATTENTION PARADIGM IN LAW 
Laws adopting a tactful inattention paradigm shift the 
balance of power and thereby change the intensity of scrutiny: if 
we move the burden of protecting information toward those who 
want to exploit others’ data, they might put less energy into 
inquisitiveness, into voyeurism.  If we reduce or eliminate the 
profit to which disinterred information can be devoted, then 
 
228 Id. at 49. 
229 Id. at 21. Zarsky examines the likely consequences of price discrimination 
techniques like this one, along with the likelihood of prohibited profiling techniques 
that the practice of “Weblining” can produce. Id. at 25–26, 47–50. He notes as well 
the information imbalance that arises to the consumer’s detriment when the seller 
has a lot of information about the customer’s “demand curve” and “reserve price,” 
and the consumer’s ignorance of corresponding information on the other side. Id. at 
30–31. “The practical consequences of this phenomenon are poor and misinformed 
people paying higher prices for products due to ignorance of information market 
dynamics.” Id. at 31. See also Nathan Newman, The Costs of Lost Privacy: Consumer 
Harm and Rising Economic Inequality in the Age of Google, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 849, 852–53 (2014) (discussing possible consequences of Google’s mechanism 
that allows advertisers to target specific users, such as payday lenders and subprime 
mortgage lenders, to find financially imperiled consumers). Concerned with “online 
behavioral targeting” on the basis of race, Professor Newman argues for “a detailed 
and explicit ‘opt-in’ consent” for Google to collect certain data. Id. at 886. 
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others will be less motivated to unearth the personal and 
sensitive information to begin with.  By moving away from the 
secrecy paradigm towards the tactful inattention paradigm, we 
can help promote advantageous uses of personally identifiable 
information such as those for medical research.230  For example, 
large aggregate patient databases are being mined for research 
due to their rich nature. 231  The secrecy paradigm may rely on 
the anonymization of data—treating as “secret” information that 
has supposedly been peeled of individual markers—
“deidentified,” in HIPAA’s parlance232—but modern technology 
continues to defeat anonymizing techniques.233  Alternatively, 
forced anonymization of data can strip the usefulness of data for 
researchers.234  By recognizing that such data may be personally 
identifiable—that is, it may have lost its secrecy—but forbidding 
certain uses of it, we can preserve the usefulness of the data to 
medical research while still preventing its original sources from 
being unduly harmed by its “visibility.” 
By prohibiting specific uses of information, a tactful 
inattention-focused law can guard against a harm Professor 
Solove identifies: “[t]he risk of disclosure [that] can prevent 
people from engaging in activities that further their own self-
development.”235  The tactful inattention paradigm can also 
address the law’s tendency to permit disclosure that would 
otherwise be prohibited but for the fact that others know of it.236 
This is not to argue that the secrecy paradigm is useless and 
should be replaced wholesale.  Tactful inattention cannot 
satisfactorily resolve all injuries to privacy.  Some injuries result 
from the sheer and simple exposure of certain information itself.  
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Professor Solove specifically identifies “deeply primordial” 
information that “is not revealing of anything we typically use to 
judge people’s character.”237  The secrecy paradigm, enforced 
through social conventions, remains necessary for this type of 
information.  
Rather, it is to urge the consideration of a different, 
potentially supplementary approach in certain contexts.  Neither 
paradigm serves well in all instances.  Professor Jerry Kang, in 
writing about information privacy in cyberspace and 
surveillance,238 discusses the problem of general laws governing 
the flow of all personal information that would “constrain too 
often even casual observation.”239  He was writing of the 
difference between regulating the flow of personal information in 
real space as opposed to cyberspace,240 but the same issues can 
arise in cyberspace with digital information. 
Furthermore, while technology has heightened the 
availability of personal data, it may also help implement the 
tactful inattention paradigm.  For instance, Professor Paul Ohm 
has compared attempts to keep personally identifiable 
information from being reidentified to the game of “whack-a-
mole.”241  However, by working with technology to identify 
tracking and auditing functions to control the use, rather than 
the observation, of data, we can work with developing technology 
instead of against it, and we can monitor and identify uses of 
personal data.  Professor Ohm argues that computer security 
research can lead to techniques to monitor access controls and 
audit trails, permitting users to interact with the data only in 
predetermined, limited ways, and recording users’ use of data.242  
In this way, laws modeled on the tactful inattention paradigm 
can be enforced, calling out users’ uses, rather than targets’ slips. 
In summary, the tactful inattention paradigm offers an 
alternative, or perhaps supplementary approach, to protecting 
privacy that can be an effective option in some circumstances, 
while not serving the best balance of interests in others. 
 
237 Id. at 533. 
238 See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1193 (1988). 
239 Id. at 1268. 
240 Id. 
241 Ohm, supra note 233, at 1742. 
242 Id. at 1757. 
2018] TACTFUL INATTENTION IN THE DIGITAL AGE 325 
CONCLUSION 
The secrecy paradigm may have served the analog age 
profitably well, but sensitive data is simply too accessible for that 
paradigm to continue as the model for all privacy laws.  The 
nature of information and people’s relationship to it has changed, 
but people continue to need privacy to flourish as individuals and 
in our relationships. 
Erving Goffman’s tactful inattention concept can serve as the 
basis of a new paradigm, one that requires us to avert our eyes 
from data when using it would unjustifiably impair someone’s 
privacy.  Aspects of American law have long used such a 
paradigm, such as in evidence law and Peeping Tom statutes.  
Recently, legislatures have been turning to a tactful inattention 
model for legislation addressing some of our modern information 
capabilities, such as in the GINA and the FCRA.  Two areas ripe 
for continued implementation of the paradigm are employment 
law and the use by employers of their employees’ social media 
information, and the use by political campaigns and vendors of 
the data consumers cannot help but leave behind in their forays 
on the Internet.  A tactful inattention paradigm, by recognizing 
that digital data has become widely accessible, can redistribute 
the responsibility for preventing sensitive information’s misuse 
and thereby reinvigorate privacy law to promote human 
flourishing. 
